

# Working Session

Random Variables, Expectation, and Variance

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## Where We Are

Monday's foundation → today's practice

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**Today** is a mix of *practice* and *new ideas*:

- **Two problems per concept** — one abstract (dice), one applied (courts, elections, wait times) — for both sides of the room
- Deeper work on **variance** and **Jensen** with worked examples
- New ideas: **independence**, joint events ( $A \cap B = \text{"A intersect B"}$ ), **monotonicity**
- **Indicator variables** and linearity of expectation as a shortcut

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- **Indicator variables** and linearity of expectation as a shortcut

### Goal

Collect all these ideas, get your hands dirty, and walk out ready for the problem set.

# Notation Reference

All the symbols in one place

## Random Variables: The Basics

Symbol	Name	Meaning
$X$	Random variable	A function from outcomes to numbers
$x$	Realized value	A specific number $X$ could equal
$\Omega$	Sample space	Set of all possible outcomes
$\omega$	Outcome	One element of $\Omega$
$f(x)$	PMF or PDF	Probability (discrete) or density (continuous) at $x$
$\text{Supp}[X]$	Support	Values where $f(x) > 0$

### Key distinction:

- $X$  is **random** — we don't know its value yet
- $x$  is a **number** — a specific value we're asking about

## Distributions: PMF, PDF, CDF

Symbol	Name	Formula	Use
$f(x)$ or $p(x)$	PMF	$\mathbb{P}(X = x)$	Discrete: probability of exactly $x$
$f(x)$	PDF	—	Continuous: density at $x$
$F(x)$	CDF	$\mathbb{P}(X \leq x)$	Both: probability up to $x$

### Key facts:

- PMF:  $\sum_x f(x) = 1$  (probabilities sum to 1)
- PDF:  $\int f(x) dx = 1$  (area under curve = 1)
- PDF can exceed 1! It's density, not probability.
- CDF: Always between 0 and 1, non-decreasing

## Expectation and Variance

Concept	Discrete	Continuous
Expected value	$\mathbb{E}[X] = \sum_x x \cdot f(x)$	$\mathbb{E}[X] = \int x \cdot f(x) dx$
LOTUS	$\mathbb{E}[g(X)] = \sum_x g(x) \cdot f(x)$	$\mathbb{E}[g(X)] = \int g(x) \cdot f(x) dx$
Variance	$\text{Var}[X] = \mathbb{E}[X^2] - (\mathbb{E}[X])^2$	

### Key properties:

- Linearity:  $\mathbb{E}[aX + b] = a\mathbb{E}[X] + b$
- Variance:  $\text{Var}[aX + b] = a^2 \text{Var}[X]$  (constants disappear!)
- Jensen: If  $g$  is convex,  $\mathbb{E}[g(X)] \geq g(\mathbb{E}[X])$

# Worked Problems

Let's calculate together

## Problem 1: PMF of a Die Roll

Let  $X$  = outcome of rolling a fair 6-sided die.

### Questions:

1. What is the support of  $X$ ?
2. Write out the PMF  $f(x)$ .
3. What is  $\mathbb{P}(X \leq 3)$ ?
4. What is  $\mathbb{P}(X > 4)$ ?

## Problem 1: PMF of a Die Roll

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### Questions:

1. What is the support of  $X$ ?
2. Write out the PMF  $f(x)$ .
3. What is  $\mathbb{P}(X \leq 3)$ ?
4. What is  $\mathbb{P}(X > 4)$ ?

### Answers:

1.  $\text{Supp}[X] = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$
2.  $f(x) = \frac{1}{6}$  for  $x \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$ , and  $f(x) = 0$  otherwise
3.  $\mathbb{P}(X \leq 3) = F(3) = \frac{3}{6} = \frac{1}{2}$
4.  $\mathbb{P}(X > 4) = 1 - \mathbb{P}(X \leq 4) = 1 - \frac{4}{6} = \frac{1}{3}$

## Our Running Example: A Redistricting Case

Setting up the court

A state supreme court with 5 justices hears a redistricting case. An analyst estimates each justice's probability of voting to strike down the map:

Justice	1	2	3	4	5
$\mathbb{P}(\text{strike})$	0.70	0.60	0.55	0.40	0.35
$\mathbb{P}(\text{uphold})$	0.30	0.40	0.45	0.60	0.65

Each justice's column sums to 1 — but the strike probabilities *across* justices don't need to.

Let  $X$  = total number of justices who vote to strike. If they vote **independently**, how do we get the PMF of  $X$  from these individual probabilities?

## From Individual Probabilities to a PMF

$f(0)$ : All justices uphold

Justice	1	2	3	4	5
$\mathbb{P}(\text{strike})$	0.70	0.60	0.55	0.40	0.35
$\mathbb{P}(\text{uphold})$	<b>0.30</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.65</b>

$\mathbb{P}(X = 0)$ : *all* 5 justices uphold. Independence means we **multiply**:

$$f(0) = 0.30 \times 0.40 \times 0.45 \times 0.60 \times 0.65 = 0.02$$

## From Individual Probabilities to a PMF

$f(5)$ : All justices strike

Justice	1	2	3	4	5
$\mathbb{P}(\text{strike})$	<b>0.70</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.35</b>
$\mathbb{P}(\text{uphold})$	0.30	0.40	0.45	0.60	0.65

$\mathbb{P}(X = 5)$ : *all* 5 strike. Same logic:

$$f(5) = 0.70 \times 0.60 \times 0.55 \times 0.40 \times 0.35 = 0.03$$

The middle values are harder — we have to sum over *which* justices strike.

## From Individual Probabilities to a PMF

$f(1)$ : Exactly one justice strikes — Justice 1

Justice	1	2	3	4	5
$\mathbb{P}(\text{strike})$	<b>0.70</b>	0.60	0.55	0.40	0.35
$\mathbb{P}(\text{uphold})$	0.30	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.65</b>

For  $f(1)$ , exactly one justice strikes. There are 5 ways. Start with Justice 1:

$$\text{J1 strikes: } 0.70 \times 0.40 \times 0.45 \times 0.60 \times 0.65 = 0.0491$$

## From Individual Probabilities to a PMF

$f(1)$ : Exactly one justice strikes — Justice 2

Justice	1	2	3	4	5
$\mathbb{P}(\text{strike})$	0.70	<b>0.60</b>	0.55	0.40	0.35
$\mathbb{P}(\text{uphold})$	<b>0.30</b>	0.40	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.65</b>

Now Justice 2 is the lone striker:

$$\text{J1 strikes: } 0.70 \times 0.40 \times 0.45 \times 0.60 \times 0.65 = 0.0491$$

$$\text{J2 strikes: } 0.30 \times 0.60 \times 0.45 \times 0.60 \times 0.65 = 0.0316$$

## From Individual Probabilities to a PMF

$f(1)$ : Exactly one justice strikes — Justice 3

Justice	1	2	3	4	5
$\mathbb{P}(\text{strike})$	0.70	0.60	<b>0.55</b>	0.40	0.35
$\mathbb{P}(\text{uphold})$	<b>0.30</b>	<b>0.40</b>	0.45	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.65</b>

Justice 3 is the lone striker:

$$\text{J1 strikes: } 0.70 \times 0.40 \times 0.45 \times 0.60 \times 0.65 = 0.0491$$

$$\text{J2 strikes: } 0.30 \times 0.60 \times 0.45 \times 0.60 \times 0.65 = 0.0316$$

$$\text{J3 strikes: } \mathbf{0.30} \times \mathbf{0.40} \times \mathbf{0.55} \times \mathbf{0.60} \times \mathbf{0.65} = 0.0257$$

## From Individual Probabilities to a PMF

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$$\text{J4 strikes: } \mathbf{0.30} \times \mathbf{0.40} \times \mathbf{0.45} \times \mathbf{0.40} \times \mathbf{0.65} = 0.0140$$

## From Individual Probabilities to a PMF

$f(1)$ : Exactly one justice strikes — Justice 5

Justice	1	2	3	4	5
$\mathbb{P}(\text{strike})$	0.70	0.60	0.55	0.40	<b>0.35</b>
$\mathbb{P}(\text{uphold})$	<b>0.30</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.60</b>	0.65

Justice 5 is the lone striker:

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$$\text{J4 strikes: } 0.30 \times 0.40 \times 0.45 \times 0.40 \times 0.65 = 0.0140$$

$$\text{J5 strikes: } \mathbf{0.30 \times 0.40 \times 0.45 \times 0.60 \times 0.35 = 0.0113}$$

## From Individual Probabilities to a PMF

Summing the five cases and the full PMF

Justice	1	2	3	4	5
$\mathbb{P}(\text{strike})$	0.70	0.60	0.55	0.40	0.35
$\mathbb{P}(\text{uphold})$	0.30	0.40	0.45	0.60	0.65

$$f(1) = 0.0491 + 0.0316 + 0.0257 + 0.0140 + 0.0113 = 0.13$$

For  $f(2)$ :  $\binom{5}{2} = 10$  terms. For  $f(3)$ : another 10. Same logic, more adding. The full PMF:

$x$	0	1	2	3	4	5
$f(x)$	0.02	0.13	0.31	0.34	0.17	0.03

## Why Exactly 5 Terms?

A quick note on counting before we move on

You just saw us write out 5 separate products for  $f(1)$ . Why 5?

Because there are exactly 5 ways to choose which *one* justice strikes. Mathematicians write this as:

$$\binom{5}{1} = \frac{5!}{1! \cdot 4!} = 5$$

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And that's why  $f(2)$  would require  $\binom{5}{2} = \frac{5!}{2! \cdot 3!} = 10$  terms — 10 ways to pick which *two* justices strike.

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And that's why  $f(2)$  would require  $\binom{5}{2} = \frac{5!}{2! \cdot 3!} = 10$  terms — 10 ways to pick which *two* justices strike.

**Key point:** if all 5 justices had the *same* strike probability  $p$ , those terms would all be equal and you could use the **binomial** shortcut:  $f(k) = \binom{5}{k} p^k (1-p)^{5-k}$ .

But our justices have *different* probabilities — so we're stuck adding up each term individually. That's exactly what we just did.

## Problem 1b: A State Supreme Court Vote

Recall the redistricting court.  $X$  = number who vote to strike down the map:

$x$	0	1	2	3	4	5
$f(x)$	0.02	0.13	0.31	0.34	0.17	0.03

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### Questions:

1. Verify this is a valid PMF.
2. What is  $\mathbb{P}(X \geq 3)$ ? (i.e., the map gets struck down)
3. What is  $\mathbb{P}(X = 2 \text{ or } X = 3)$ ?

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### Answers:

1.  $\sum f(x) = 0.02 + 0.13 + 0.31 + 0.34 + 0.17 + 0.03 = 1 \checkmark$ , all  $f(x) \geq 0 \checkmark$
2.  $\mathbb{P}(X \geq 3) = 0.34 + 0.17 + 0.03 = 0.54$
3.  $\mathbb{P}(X = 2 \text{ or } X = 3) = 0.31 + 0.34 = 0.65$

## Problem 2: Expected Value of Die Roll

Same die roll:  $X \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$ , each with probability  $\frac{1}{6}$ .

**Calculate**  $\mathbb{E}[X]$ .

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**Calculate**  $\mathbb{E}[X]$ .

**Solution:**

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[X] &= \sum_{x=1}^6 x \cdot f(x) = \sum_{x=1}^6 x \cdot \frac{1}{6} \\ &= \frac{1}{6}(1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6) \\ &= \frac{1}{6}(21) = 3.5\end{aligned}$$

Note:  $\mathbb{E}[X] = 3.5$  is not in the support! The mean doesn't have to be a possible value.

## Problem 2b: Expected Votes to Strike Down

Same redistricting case. Recall the PMF:

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$f(x)$	0.02	0.13	0.31	0.34	0.17	0.03

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Calculate  $\mathbb{E}[X]$ .

**Solution:**

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[X] &= 0(0.02) + 1(0.13) + 2(0.31) + 3(0.34) + 4(0.17) + 5(0.03) \\ &= 0 + 0.13 + 0.62 + 1.02 + 0.68 + 0.15 = 2.60\end{aligned}$$

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On average, about 2.6 justices vote to strike — just short of the 3-vote majority. The map survives more often than not, but barely.

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**Step 1:** Calculate  $\mathbb{E}[X^2]$ .

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$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[X^2] &= \frac{1}{6}(1^2 + 2^2 + 3^2 + 4^2 + 5^2 + 6^2) \\ &= \frac{1}{6}(1 + 4 + 9 + 16 + 25 + 36) = \frac{91}{6} \approx 15.17\end{aligned}$$

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**Step 2:** Apply the formula.

$$\text{Var}[X] = \mathbb{E}[X^2] - (\mathbb{E}[X])^2 = \frac{91}{6} - (3.5)^2 = \frac{91}{6} - \frac{49}{4} = \frac{35}{12} \approx 2.92$$

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**Jensen check:**  $\mathbb{E}[X^2] = 15.17 > (\mathbb{E}[X])^2 = 12.25 \checkmark$

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**Step 2:** Apply the formula.

$$\text{Var}[X] = \mathbb{E}[X^2] - (\mathbb{E}[X])^2 = 7.90 - (2.60)^2 = 7.90 - 6.76 = 1.14$$

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**Jensen check:**  $\mathbb{E}[X^2] = 7.90 > (\mathbb{E}[X])^2 = 6.76 \checkmark$

Compare: the die had  $\text{Var} = 2.92$  over 6 values. The court vote has  $\text{Var} = 1.14$  — much less spread because the PMF concentrates around 2–3.

## Problem 4: Indicator Variables

The bridge between probability and expectation

An **indicator variable**  $D$  equals 1 if an event occurs, 0 otherwise.

**Key insight:**

$$\mathbb{E}[D] = 1 \cdot \mathbb{P}(D = 1) + 0 \cdot \mathbb{P}(D = 0) = \mathbb{P}(D = 1)$$

### The Bridge

**Expected value of an indicator = Probability of the event**

**Example:** Draw one card from a deck. Let  $D = 1$  if it's an Ace.

$$\mathbb{E}[D] = \mathbb{P}(\text{Ace}) = \frac{4}{52} = \frac{1}{13}$$

## Problem 4b: Indicators on the Court

Same court, easier path to  $\mathbb{E}[X]$

We already know the individual strike probabilities. Define  $D_i = 1$  if Justice  $i$  votes to strike, so  $X = D_1 + D_2 + D_3 + D_4 + D_5$ .

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By linearity of expectation:

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = \mathbb{E}[D_1] + \mathbb{E}[D_2] + \mathbb{E}[D_3] + \mathbb{E}[D_4] + \mathbb{E}[D_5] = 0.70 + 0.60 + 0.55 + 0.40 + 0.35 = 2.60$$

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Same answer as Problem 2b — **it has to be**. It's the same  $X$ .

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Same answer as Problem 2b — **it has to be**. It's the same  $X$ .

But think about what we *didn't* need: we never touched the PMF table. No summing  $x \cdot f(x)$  over all 6 outcomes. Linearity gave us  $\mathbb{E}[X]$  straight from the individual probabilities.

## Problem 5: Counting Aces in a Hand

Indicator variables + Linearity of expectation

Deal 5 cards from a standard deck. Let  $X$  = number of Aces.

**The hard way:** Find the full PMF of  $X$ , then compute  $\mathbb{E}[X]$ .

**The easy way:** Use indicator variables!

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Define:  $D_i = 1$  if card  $i$  is an Ace, for  $i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5$ .

Then:  $X = D_1 + D_2 + D_3 + D_4 + D_5$

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Then:  $X = D_1 + D_2 + D_3 + D_4 + D_5$

By linearity of expectation:

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = \mathbb{E}[D_1] + \mathbb{E}[D_2] + \mathbb{E}[D_3] + \mathbb{E}[D_4] + \mathbb{E}[D_5]$$

## Problem 5: Counting Aces in a Hand

Indicator variables + Linearity of expectation

Deal 5 cards from a standard deck. Let  $X$  = number of Aces.

**The hard way:** Find the full PMF of  $X$ , then compute  $\mathbb{E}[X]$ .

**The easy way:** Use indicator variables!

Define:  $D_i = 1$  if card  $i$  is an Ace, for  $i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5$ .

Then:  $X = D_1 + D_2 + D_3 + D_4 + D_5$

By linearity of expectation:

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = \mathbb{E}[D_1] + \mathbb{E}[D_2] + \mathbb{E}[D_3] + \mathbb{E}[D_4] + \mathbb{E}[D_5]$$

Each  $\mathbb{E}[D_i] = \mathbb{P}(\text{card } i \text{ is Ace}) = \frac{4}{52} = \frac{1}{13}$

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = 5 \times \frac{1}{13} = \frac{5}{13} \approx 0.385$$

## Problem 5: Why This Works

The magic of linearity

**Wait** — aren't the cards dependent? After drawing an Ace, fewer Aces remain!

**Yes, but it doesn't matter for expectation!**

Linearity of expectation says:

$$\mathbb{E}[D_1 + D_2 + \cdots + D_n] = \mathbb{E}[D_1] + \mathbb{E}[D_2] + \cdots + \mathbb{E}[D_n]$$

**always** — regardless of whether the  $D_i$  are independent.

### Key Takeaway

To find  $\mathbb{E}[\text{count}]$ , just sum the individual probabilities.

No need to find the joint distribution!

This is why indicator variables are the “fundamental bridge” between probability and expectation.

## Problem 5b: How Many Swing States?

Linearity of expectation in elections

A candidate contests 7 battleground states. Let  $X$  = number won.

Define  $D_i = 1$  if the candidate wins state  $i$ , where  $\mathbb{P}(D_i = 1)$  comes from a forecasting model:

State	PA	MI	WI	AZ	GA	NV	NC
$\mathbb{P}(D_i = 1)$	0.55	0.52	0.53	0.45	0.42	0.50	0.38

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These outcomes are **highly dependent** (national mood affects all states).

But linearity doesn't care!


$$\mathbb{E}[X] = 0.55 + 0.52 + 0.53 + 0.45 + 0.42 + 0.50 + 0.38 = 3.35$$

On average, the candidate wins about 3.4 of 7 battlegrounds — but the dependence means the actual outcome is much more “all or nothing” than 3.35 suggests.

## The Uniform Distribution: Quick Review

Density is a height, probability is an area

If  $X \sim \text{Uniform}(0, 2)$ , the PDF is  $f(x) = \frac{1}{2}$  for  $x \in [0, 2]$ :



**Interpreting density:**  $f(x) = \frac{1}{2}$  is *not* a probability — it's a *height*. To get probability, take the **area under the curve**:

$$\mathbb{P}(0.5 \leq X \leq 1.5) = \underbrace{(1.5 - 0.5)}_{\text{base}} \times \underbrace{\frac{1}{2}}_{\text{height}} = \frac{1}{2}$$

## The Uniform Distribution: Key Formulas

Reference for Problems 6–7

In general, for  $X \sim \text{Uniform}(a, b)$ :

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{b-a} \quad \text{for } x \in [a, b]$$

**Probability** (area of a rectangle):

$$\mathbb{P}(c \leq X \leq d) = (d - c) \cdot \frac{1}{b-a}$$

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**Probability** (area of a rectangle):

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**Key formulas:**

---

Expected value	$\mathbb{E}[X] = \frac{a+b}{2}$	(the midpoint)
Variance	$\text{Var}[X] = \frac{(b-a)^2}{12}$	(wider support $\Rightarrow$ more spread)

---

## Problem 6: Uniform Distribution

Let  $X \sim \text{Uniform}(0, 2)$ . The PDF is  $f(x) = \frac{1}{2}$  for  $x \in [0, 2]$ .

### Questions:

1. What is  $\mathbb{P}(X \leq 1)$ ?
2. What is  $\mathbb{P}(0.5 < X < 1.5)$ ?
3. What is  $\mathbb{E}[X]$ ?

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### Answers:


1.  $\mathbb{P}(X \leq 1) = \int_0^1 \frac{1}{2} dx = \frac{1}{2}$
2.  $\mathbb{P}(0.5 < X < 1.5) = \int_{0.5}^{1.5} \frac{1}{2} dx = \frac{1}{2}(1.5 - 0.5) = \frac{1}{2}$
3.  $\mathbb{E}[X] = \int_0^2 x \cdot \frac{1}{2} dx = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{x^2}{2} \Big|_0^2 = \frac{1}{2} \cdot 2 = 1$

For  $\text{Uniform}(a, b)$ :  $\mathbb{E}[X] = \frac{a+b}{2}$  (the midpoint)

## Voter Wait Times: Visualizing the PDF

$W \sim \text{Uniform}(0, 60)$  minutes

A precinct's wait time follows  $\text{Uniform}(0, 60)$ . The PDF is  $f(w) = \frac{1}{60}$  for  $w \in [0, 60]$ :



$$\mathbb{P}(W \leq 15) = \underbrace{15}_{\text{base}} \times \underbrace{\frac{1}{60}}_{\text{height}} = \frac{1}{4}$$

Same logic as before — just a wider, shorter rectangle.

## Problem 6b: Voter Wait Times

A precinct's wait time  $W$  follows Uniform(0, 60) minutes. The PDF is  $f(w) = \frac{1}{60}$  for  $w \in [0, 60]$ .

### Questions:

1. What is  $\mathbb{P}(W \leq 15)$ ? (voter waits 15 min or less)
2. What is  $\mathbb{P}(W > 45)$ ? (voter waits more than 45 min)
3. What is  $\mathbb{E}[W]$ ?

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
### Answers:

1.  $\mathbb{P}(W \leq 15) = \int_0^{15} \frac{1}{60} dw = \frac{15}{60} = \frac{1}{4}$
2.  $\mathbb{P}(W > 45) = 1 - \mathbb{P}(W \leq 45) = 1 - \frac{45}{60} = \frac{1}{4}$
3.  $\mathbb{E}[W] = \frac{0+60}{2} = 30$  minutes

## Problem 7: Variance of Uniform

How spread out is  $X$ ?


Still  $X \sim \text{Uniform}(0, 2)$ . We know  $\mathbb{E}[X] = 1$ . How spread out are values around the mean?



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
$$\text{Step 1: } \mathbb{E}[X^2] = \int_0^2 x^2 \cdot \frac{1}{2} dx = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{x^3}{3} \Big|_0^2 = \frac{4}{3}$$

$$\text{Step 2: } \text{Var}[X] = \mathbb{E}[X^2] - (\mathbb{E}[X])^2 = \frac{4}{3} - 1 = \frac{1}{3}, \quad \text{so } \sigma = \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}} \approx 0.58$$

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General formula: For  $\text{Uniform}(a, b)$ ,  $\text{Var}[X] = \frac{(b-a)^2}{12}$ . Here:  $\frac{4}{12} = \frac{1}{3} \checkmark$

## Problem 7b: Variance of Voter Wait Times

Still  $W \sim \text{Uniform}(0, 60)$ . We know  $\mathbb{E}[W] = 30$ . Find  $\text{Var}[W]$ .

**Step 1:** Calculate  $\mathbb{E}[W^2]$ .

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$$\mathbb{E}[W^2] = \int_0^{60} w^2 \cdot \frac{1}{60} dw = \frac{1}{60} \cdot \frac{w^3}{3} \Big|_0^{60} = \frac{1}{60} \cdot \frac{216000}{3} = 1200$$

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**Step 2:** Apply the formula.

$$\text{Var}[W] = \mathbb{E}[W^2] - (\mathbb{E}[W])^2 = 1200 - 900 = 300$$

## Problem 7b: Variance of Voter Wait Times

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$$\text{Var}[W] = \mathbb{E}[W^2] - (\mathbb{E}[W])^2 = 1200 - 900 = 300$$

**Standard deviation:**  $\sigma = \sqrt{300} \approx 17.3$  minutes.

Check: Uniform( $a, b$ ) formula gives  $\frac{(60-0)^2}{12} = \frac{3600}{12} = 300 \checkmark$

## Problem 8: Is $g(x) = x^2$ Convex?

Setting up Jensen's inequality

Jensen's inequality requires  $g$  to be **convex**. How do we check?

### Second Derivative Test

A twice-differentiable function  $g$  is convex if and only if  $g''(x) \geq 0$  for all  $x$ .

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### Second Derivative Test

A twice-differentiable function  $g$  is convex if and only if  $g''(x) \geq 0$  for all  $x$ .

**Check:** Let  $g(x) = x^2$ .

$$g'(x) = 2x$$


$$g''(x) = 2 > 0 \quad \text{for all } x \checkmark$$

So  $g(x) = x^2$  is convex, and Jensen tells us:

$$\mathbb{E}[X^2] \geq (\mathbb{E}[X])^2$$

# Visualizing Jensen's Inequality

Why the chord lies above the curve



For convex functions, the average of  $g(X)$  (on the chord) always exceeds  $g$  evaluated at the average (on the curve).

## Problem 9: Jensen's Inequality in Action

Suppose  $X$  takes values 1, 2, 3 with equal probability  $\frac{1}{3}$  each.

**Verify Jensen's inequality** for  $g(x) = x^2$  (convex, since  $g'' = 2 > 0$ ).

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$$\mathbb{E}[X^2] = \frac{1}{3}(1^2 + 2^2 + 3^2) = \frac{1}{3}(1 + 4 + 9) = \frac{14}{3} \approx 4.67$$

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**Jensen says:**  $\mathbb{E}[X^2] \geq (\mathbb{E}[X])^2$

**Check:**  $4.67 \geq 4 \checkmark$

**Variance:**  $\text{Var}[X] = 4.67 - 4 = \frac{2}{3} \geq 0 \checkmark$

## Problem 9b: Jensen and Campaign Advertising

A campaign's vote share gain from ad spending  $X$  (in \$millions) is  $g(X) = \sqrt{X}$  — **concave** (diminishing returns), since  $g''(x) = -\frac{1}{4}x^{-3/2} < 0$ .

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**Jensen (concave):**  $\mathbb{E}[\sqrt{X}] = 2.0 \leq \sqrt{\mathbb{E}[X]} = 2.24 \checkmark$

### Political Implication

Uncertain ad budgets perform *worse* on average than spending the mean amount for certain. Volatility hurts when returns are concave.

# Two More Properties

Monotonicity and Independence

## Monotonicity of Expectation

Bigger inputs, bigger expected values

### Monotonicity

If  $X \leq Y$  for all outcomes (i.e.,  $X(\omega) \leq Y(\omega)$  for all  $\omega$ ), then:

$$\mathbb{E}[X] \leq \mathbb{E}[Y]$$

**Intuition:** If  $X$  never exceeds  $Y$ , its average can't exceed  $Y$ 's average either.

**Example:** Suppose you're comparing two jobs:

- Job A pays \$40k, \$50k, or \$60k (equally likely)
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Every outcome of B exceeds A, so:

$$\mathbb{E}[A] = 50k \leq \mathbb{E}[B] = 55k \checkmark$$

## Problem 10: Monotonicity in Action

Let  $X$  be a random variable with  $0 \leq X \leq 1$  (always).

### Questions:

1. What can you say about  $\mathbb{E}[X]$ ?
2. Since  $0 \leq X \leq 1$ , we know  $X^2 \leq X$  (always). What does monotonicity tell us about  $\mathbb{E}[X^2]$  vs  $\mathbb{E}[X]$ ?

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**Check with Uniform(0,1):**  $\mathbb{E}[X^2] = \frac{1}{3}$  and  $\mathbb{E}[X] = \frac{1}{2}$ . Indeed  $\frac{1}{3} \leq \frac{1}{2}$  ✓

## Problem 10b: Rain and Voter Turnout

Let  $T_R$  = precinct turnout on a rainy day,  $T_C$  = turnout on a clear day.

Research shows rain depresses turnout: for every possible election scenario,  
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### Answers:

1. Since  $T_R \leq T_C$  always, monotonicity gives  $\mathbb{E}[T_R] \leq \mathbb{E}[T_C]$ .
2.  $\mathbb{E}[T_R] \leq 0.62$ . (We can bound the mean without knowing the full distribution of  $T_R$ .)

Monotonicity is a simple but powerful bounding tool — it lets you make statements about expectations from qualitative ordering alone.

# Independence of Random Variables

Quick review

## Independence

$X$  and  $Y$  are **independent** ( $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$ ) if knowing the value of one tells you nothing about the other:

$$F_{X,Y}(x, y) = F_X(x) \cdot F_Y(y) \quad \text{for all } x, y$$

**Key consequences when  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$ :**

- $\mathbb{E}[XY] = \mathbb{E}[X] \cdot \mathbb{E}[Y]$
- $\text{Var}[X + Y] = \text{Var}[X] + \text{Var}[Y]$
- $\text{Cov}[X, Y] = 0$

Warning:  $\text{Cov}[X, Y] = 0$  does NOT imply independence! (We'll see why in Week 4.)

## Problem 11: Independence and Variance

Roll two fair dice independently. Let  $X$  = first die,  $Y$  = second die,  $S = X + Y$ .

### Questions:

1. Find  $\mathbb{E}[S]$ .
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**Part 1:** By linearity (always works):

$$\mathbb{E}[S] = \mathbb{E}[X + Y] = \mathbb{E}[X] + \mathbb{E}[Y] = 3.5 + 3.5 = 7$$

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**Part 1:** By linearity (always works):

$$\mathbb{E}[S] = \mathbb{E}[X + Y] = \mathbb{E}[X] + \mathbb{E}[Y] = 3.5 + 3.5 = 7$$

**Part 2:** Since  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$ , variances add:

$$\text{Var}[S] = \text{Var}[X + Y] = \text{Var}[X] + \text{Var}[Y] = \frac{35}{12} + \frac{35}{12} = \frac{35}{6} \approx 5.83$$

## Problem 11: Independence and Variance

Roll two fair dice independently. Let  $X$  = first die,  $Y$  = second die,  $S = X + Y$ .

### Questions:

1. Find  $\mathbb{E}[S]$ .
2. Find  $\text{Var}[S]$ .

**Part 1:** By linearity (always works):

$$\mathbb{E}[S] = \mathbb{E}[X + Y] = \mathbb{E}[X] + \mathbb{E}[Y] = 3.5 + 3.5 = 7$$

**Part 2:** Since  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$ , variances add:

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Note:  $\mathbb{E}[S]$  uses linearity (works always).  $\text{Var}[S] = \text{Var}[X] + \text{Var}[Y]$  uses **independence**. Without independence, we'd need  $\text{Cov}[X, Y]$  too.

## Problem 11b: Combining Independent Precincts

Two precincts report independently. Let  $V_A$  = votes for a candidate in Precinct A,  $V_B$  = votes in Precinct B. Total:  $T = V_A + V_B$ .

Given:  $\mathbb{E}[V_A] = 800$ ,  $\text{Var}[V_A] = 2500$ ,  $\mathbb{E}[V_B] = 1200$ ,  $\text{Var}[V_B] = 4000$ .

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$$\mathbb{E}[T] = \mathbb{E}[V_A] + \mathbb{E}[V_B] = 800 + 1200 = 2000$$

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$$\text{Var}[T] = \text{Var}[V_A] + \text{Var}[V_B] = 2500 + 4000 = 6500$$

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$$\text{Var}[T] = \text{Var}[V_A] + \text{Var}[V_B] = 2500 + 4000 = 6500$$

What if the precincts were **not** independent — say, both affected by local weather? Then variances don't simply add. We'll need a new tool called **covariance** to handle that case. Coming soon.

## Summary

What we practiced today

- **PMF/PDF:** Writing out distributions, computing probabilities
- **Expected value:** The weighted average formula
- **Variance:**  $\text{Var}[X] = \mathbb{E}[X^2] - (\mathbb{E}[X])^2$
- **Indicator variables:**  $\mathbb{E}[D] = \mathbb{P}(\text{event})$
- **Linearity:**  $\mathbb{E}[\sum D_i] = \sum \mathbb{E}[D_i]$  — works even with dependence!
- **Jensen:**  $\mathbb{E}[X^2] \geq (\mathbb{E}[X])^2$ , so variance  $\geq 0$
- **Monotonicity:**  $X \leq Y$  always  $\implies \mathbb{E}[X] \leq \mathbb{E}[Y]$
- **Independence:**  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y \implies \text{Var}[X + Y] = \text{Var}[X] + \text{Var}[Y]$

### For Your Problem Sets

Practice these calculations until they're automatic.

The notation should feel natural, not foreign.

# Next Time

## Week 3: Famous Distributions

- Bernoulli and Binomial
- Uniform (discrete and continuous)
- Normal — the star of the show
- Poisson — for counts

These distributions will appear throughout the course. Master their properties now.