

# IV: Applications and Weak Instruments

Gov 51: Data Analysis and Politics

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# Science, politics, and medicine all ask causal questions — not just descriptive ones

Field	What we observe	The causal question
Medicine	Smokers have higher cancer rates	Does smoking <i>cause</i> lung cancer?
Political science	Big spenders win elections	Does money <i>cause</i> wins, or do strong candidates attract both?
Public health	Incarcerated youth commit more crimes later	Does incarceration <i>cause</i> worse outcomes?
Economics	College grads earn more	Does education <i>cause</i> higher earnings?

Left column: a fact. Right column: a *causal* claim. They require completely different methods.

# Every major policy debate is ultimately a causal question

## Domestic and social policy:

- ▷ Does raising the minimum wage *cause* unemployment?
- ▷ Does Medicaid expansion *cause* better health?
- ▷ Does housing assistance *cause* upward mobility?

## Criminal justice:

- ▷ Does policing *reduce* crime, or follow it?
- ▷ Does juvenile detention *cause* more adult crime?
- ▷ Does incarceration *cause* people to re-offend less, or more?

Get the answer wrong and the policy **causes harm** instead of helping. Correlation is not enough.

# Industry runs on causal questions too

## Marketing and product:

- ▷ Does showing this ad *cause* a purchase?  
Or would the buyer have bought anyway?
- ▷ Does faster page load *cause* longer sessions?  
Or do popular pages get both?

## People and management:

- ▷ Does this training program *cause* better performance?
- ▷ Does remote work *cause* lower productivity?

**The problem:** Optimize on correlation → invest in the wrong things.

**The need:** Causal answers, not just predictions.

This is why tech companies run A/B tests. But A/B tests aren't always possible.

# Randomized experiments answer causal questions definitively

Recall from last week:

$$\underbrace{\bar{Y}_{D=1} - \bar{Y}_{D=0}}_{\text{SDO (what we observe)}} = \underbrace{E[Y_1 - Y_0]}_{\text{ATE}} + \underbrace{E[Y_0 | D = 1] - E[Y_0 | D = 0]}_{\text{selection bias}}$$

**Why randomization works:**

- ▷ Assign  $D$  randomly:  $D \perp\!\!\!\perp (Y_0, Y_1)$
  - ▷ Control group is identical to treated in expectation
  - ▷  $E[Y_0 | D = 1] = E[Y_0 | D = 0]$
  - ▷ Selection bias = 0
- ⇒ SDO = ATE

Randomization **deletes** selection bias by making the two groups equivalent in every way — on average.

## But most important causal questions cannot be answered with a randomized experiment

Unethical	Infeasible	Unaffordable
Randomly assign children to drug-using parents	Reassign colonial histories to countries	Relocate colleges across counties
Randomly incarcerate juveniles to study the effect	Randomly assign a generation to schooling levels	Run a 30-year health study for every policy

The most important causal questions — the ones with the highest policy stakes — are the hardest to study with a randomized experiment.

## When experiments are impossible, we look for the experiment that already happened

Causal question	Natural experiment (instrument)
Does parental drug use <i>cause</i> child maltreatment?	Policy variation in drug exposure ( <i>Cunningham &amp; Finlay</i> )
Do colonial institutions <i>cause</i> prosperity today?	Settler mortality rates ( <i>Acemoglu et al. 2001</i> )
Does education <i>cause</i> higher wages?	Distance to nearest 4-year college ( <i>Card 1995</i> )

**Natural experiments:** when the trial cannot be run, we find the trial that already happened.

# A 13-year-old is arrested in Chicago — which judge they face is a coin flip

## The scene:

- ▷ A minor is arrested and enters Cook County juvenile court
- ▷ Chicago has dozens of juvenile court judges
- ▷ Cases are **randomly assigned** to judges — not by merit, not by severity

## Two judges in this courthouse:

- ▷ **Judge A**: strict — incarcerates 70% of cases
- ▷ **Judge B**: lenient — incarcerates 30% of cases

**The coin flip:** Which judge you face is chance, not character.

**The variation:** Lenient judge → go home.  
Strict judge → detention.

**The instrument:** Judge leniency  $Z$  randomly assigned → predicts incarceration  $D$ .

# If incarceration causes harm, every conviction is making things worse

## If incarceration **CAUSES** bad outcomes:

- ▷ Detention  $\rightarrow$   $\downarrow$  high school graduation
  - ▷ Detention  $\rightarrow$   $\uparrow$  adult incarceration
  - ▷ System is **creating the problem it claims to solve**
- $\Rightarrow$  Case for diversion, supervision, alternatives

## If it is pure selection:

- ▷ Troubled youth have bad outcomes regardless
  - ▷ No causal path from detention to adult crime
  - ▷ System may not be causing additional harm
- $\Rightarrow$  Different policy debate entirely

You cannot answer this with OLS. Kids who get incarcerated are already higher risk. You need the coin flip.




**Part I: We Have Crossed a Line  
From Statistics to Causal Inference**

# Statistics gave us a clean, assumption-free mapping

**The setup:** average income in a city.

1. Population:  $\mu = E[X_i] = \$50,000$
2. Draw a sample: get  $\bar{x}_1 = \$45,000$
3. Draw another:  $\bar{x}_2 = \$52,000, \dots$
4. By the **LLN**:  $\bar{x} \xrightarrow{p} \mu$
5. By the **CLT**:  $\bar{x} \sim \text{Normal}(\mu, \sigma^2/n)$



No extra assumptions needed. The math does it all.

# Causality breaks the mapping — even the population estimate can be wrong

## Statistics world

Estimand:  $\mu = E[X_i]$   
Estimator:  $\bar{x} = \frac{1}{n} \sum X_i$   
Gap:  $\bar{x} - \mu \rightarrow 0$  by LLN  
Assumptions: none

Sample converges to population.  
Beautiful.

## Causal world

Estimand:  $ATE = E[Y_1 - Y_0]$   
Estimator:  $SDO = \bar{Y}_{D=1} - \bar{Y}_{D=0}$   
Gap:  $SDO = ATE + \text{selection bias}$   
Assumptions: required

Even at the population level,  $SDO \neq ATE$   
unless the design guarantees it.

# Identification is the assumption that makes the calculation causal

Two strategies that close the gap:

## 1. Random assignment

- ▷  $Y_0, Y_1 \perp\!\!\!\perp D$
- ▷ Selection bias = 0
- ▷ SDO = ATE

Designed: you control who gets treatment.

## 2. Valid instrument

- ▷  $Z \perp\!\!\!\perp u, \text{Cov}(Z, D) \neq 0$
- ▷ No direct  $Z \rightarrow Y$
- ▷ Wald =  $\beta_1$

Found: you discover randomization that was already in the world.

Neither assumption is testable from data alone. You must *design* or *discover* them.



**Part II: The Wald Estimator — A Quick  
Recap**

# Wald: the ratio of two covariances recovers the causal effect

$$\hat{\beta}_1^{\text{Wald}} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Y, Z)}{\text{Cov}(D, Z)} = \frac{\text{Reduced form}}{\text{First stage}}$$

## Three conditions:

1. **Relevance:**  $\text{Cov}(Z, D) \neq 0$  testable
2. **Exclusion:**  $Z \perp\!\!\!\perp u$  not testable
3. **Independence:**  $Z$  not caused by  $U$  not testable

**The coin flip again:**  
 $Z \perp\!\!\!\perp u$  means any  $\text{Cov}(Y, Z)$  runs through  $D$  only.

*Worksheets 1 & 2* derive this step by step.

## Stage 1: project the treatment onto the instrument, save fitted values

Regress  $D$  on  $Z$ :

$$D_i = \pi_0 + \pi_1 Z_i + v_i$$

Save the fitted values:

$$\hat{D}_i = \hat{\pi}_0 + \hat{\pi}_1 Z_i$$

$\hat{D}_i$  contains only the variation in  $D$  that is explained by  $Z$ . The endogenous noise  $v_i$  has been stripped out.

## Stage 2: regress the outcome on the cleaned-up treatment

Regress  $Y$  on  $\hat{D}$ :

$$Y_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \hat{D}_i + e_i$$

$$\hat{\delta}_1^{2SLS} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Y, \hat{D})}{\text{Var}(\hat{D})} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Y, Z)}{\text{Cov}(D, Z)} = \hat{\beta}_1^{\text{Wald}}$$

2SLS and the Wald estimator are the same thing. *Worksheet 2* shows the algebra.



**Part III: Seeing IV With Your Eyes  
First Stage and Reduced Form**

# Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson asked why some former colonies are rich and others poor

## The puzzle:

- ▷ North America, Australia, New Zealand: rich
- ▷ Congo, Nigeria, Haiti: poor
- ▷ All were European colonies — why?

## Their theory:


- ▷ Settlers built property rights and rule of law where they lived
- ▷ Extractive colonies got institutions designed only to ship resources home
- ▷ Those institutional differences persist 200 years later

### **The endogeneity problem:**


Rich countries also build good institutions — OLS cannot separate cause from effect.

**The coin flip:** Malaria and yellow fever determined where Europeans could settle — before anyone chose where to colonize.

# First stage: settler mortality predicts institutional quality




## Reduced form: settler mortality predicts income today



Wald: divide the reduced form slope by the first stage slope

$$\hat{\beta}^{\text{Wald}} = \frac{-0.570}{-0.621} = 0.917$$



## R: `iv_robust()` runs both stages and fixes standard errors

```
library(estimatr)
library(tidyverse)

ajr <- read_csv("data/ajr2001.csv")
# Outcome: log GDP per capita (logpgp95)
# Endogenous: institutional quality (avexpr)
# Instrument: log settler mortality (logem4)
fit_iv <- iv_robust(logpgp95 ~ avexpr | logem4,
                   data = ajr, se_type = "HC2")
tidy(fit_iv, conf.int = TRUE)
```

**Never** run Stage 2 by hand: use `iv_robust()` for correct SEs.

# What IV does — four things to remember

- 1. IV requires an assumption about the world**  
The exclusion restriction cannot be tested.  
You must argue it from institutional knowledge.
- 2. 2SLS uses only the clean variation in  $D$**   
Stage 1 strips the endogenous part.  
Stage 2 identifies  $\beta_1$  from what remains.
- 3. AJR: a real natural experiment**  
Settler mortality was set by ecology.  
Institutions were set by settlement.  
Income was set by institutions.
- 4. The Wald:  $RF \div FS$**   
No more, no less.


**Thursday:** What happens when the first stage is weak — and what to do about it.

## Next class: when the coin is bent

### Weak instruments and what goes wrong:

- ▷ What “weak” means precisely — and why it is catastrophic for 2SLS
- ▷ How to test: the  $F$ -statistic and the Oleva-Pflüger effective  $F$
- ▷ Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals: valid even when  $F$  is small
- ▷ Finding natural experiments: judge leniency (Aizer-Doyle 2015)
- ▷ How bad data can fake a strong instrument: the Albouy critique of AJR

If your  $F$ -statistic is below 10, Thursday's lecture is the most important thing you will hear this semester.



IV finds the randomization that was already there.  
The formula just harvests it.